Pfanzagl exchanges diagnose an anomaly in expected utility decision theory  by Snow, Paul
International Journal of Approximate Reasoning
46 (2007) 408–420
www.elsevier.com/locate/ijarPfanzagl exchanges diagnose an anomaly
in expected utility decision theory
Paul Snow *
P.O. Box 6134, Concord, NH 03303-6134, USA
Received 29 June 2005; received in revised form 22 May 2006; accepted 21 September 2006
Available online 16 November 2006Abstract
Johann Pfanzagl proposed an additional decision axiom in 1959, complementary to the usual axi-
oms, which would have tightly restricted permissible monetary utility functions. Subsequent debate
partially clariﬁed previously unacknowledged normative issues, and ended with orthodox consensus
favoring a principled reform of practice. An analytical device contributed by Pfanzagl is extended
here to show that the consensus practice sometimes conﬂicts with a principle often expressed as a
continuity axiom, in situations as simple as Allais’ famous example. The axioms have from their
beginnings been recognized as incomplete, so these new exceptions cannot much threaten the axioms’
role in such theories as a popular semantics for subjective probability. However, the paper suggests
an enhancement of sensitivity analysis in applied work, sometimes overruling orthodox advice.
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equivalent1. Introduction
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] axiomatized their view of rational decision making
in situations when precise probabilities are given. Their expected utility method forms part
of a motivation of orthodox Bayesianism, descended from Ramsey [2] and Savage [3], pre-
valent among uncertaintists in the artiﬁcial intelligence community and in the world at0888-613X/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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contemporary artiﬁcial intelligence [4] and other practical application.
From the outset, the range of problems that axiomatic decision theorists claimed to
solve was limited. Von Neumann and Morgenstern made no provision for risk-speciﬁc
aﬀects, that risk-taking itself might be a pleasant or uncomfortable experience for the deci-
sion maker. The founders did not deny that such a factor might inﬂuence rational choice;
they simply and knowingly set that factor aside. They acknowledged that there would
therefore exist some problem instances in which the advice of the axioms would be met
by other considerations, and possibly overcome for good reason.
Criticism of the received decision axioms has often been based on puzzle problems,
cases where some people’s intuition about rational risk-taking behavior contradicts
expected utility principles. One of the best known and longest-lived of these problems
was posed by Allais [5] in the early 1950s. Allais’ problem will be examined in a later sec-
tion. Apart from promoting agreement that the theory is concerned with what choices peo-
ple might be advised to make rather than what choices people actually do make, Allais’
example inspired little change in orthodox thought. It has, of course, greatly inﬂuenced
critics of the received theory.
Another puzzle-like argument, however, did much to shape contemporary orthodox
decision theory. In 1959, Pfanzagl [6], working within the von Neumann and Morgenstern
tradition, suggested an additional axiom for decisions involving money. He proposed that
if a lottery had each of its prizes decreased by some constant amount, say $50, then the
selling price of the modiﬁed lottery should be exactly $50 less than the selling price of
the original lottery.
Pfanzagl intended to make explicit an assumption which he believed that many of his
fellow early theorists had sometimes been adopting implicitly. He showed that accepting
his axiom would conﬁne the permissible utility functions for money to just two forms, lin-
ear and exponential. Without his axiom, any strictly increasing bounded function would
serve. Since the functions it would forbid express defensible attitudes towards risk, Pfan-
zagl’s proposed axiom was eventually rejected.
Pfanzagl was correct, however, that some theorists had been relying upon something
equivalent to his proposed axiom as an implicit and unacknowledged principle of choice,
even as they accepted utility functions for money that were neither linear nor exponential.
Remedy of that lapse led to the regularization of some theretofore informal decision mod-
eling practices, a reform that has endured down to the present day.
The thesis of this paper is that an authentic diﬃculty remains in the received theory’s
treatment of choices between certainties and risky lotteries with money outcomes. For util-
ity functions expressing unobjectionable attitudes towards risk, situations exist where the
principles of choice aﬃrmed in the wake of Pfanzagl’s analysis contradict what has typi-
cally been expressed in a continuity axiom. Axiomatizations diﬀer, and elements of the
expression might appear in other axioms, but the contradiction persists.
The predicament reveals an unremedied limitation on the scope of the von Neumann
and Morgenstern axioms. The principles that the axioms express are unable to give persua-
sive and unequivocal advice to all decision makers in all monetary choices.
Opportunities for conﬂict between accepted principles can arise in problems as simple
as Allais’ famous puzzle. One ﬁnding of this paper, then, is that some behavior which fails
to conform to the axioms, such as some of what was described by Allais, ought to be, and
ought always to have been, tolerated by advocates of the received theory.
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applied discipline in its own right. Conﬂict among principles might imperil both roles.
The received theory has always had problem instances outside its scope, however.
Savage accepted limitations entailed by risk-speciﬁc aﬀects on his joint treatment of sub-
jective probability and rational choice [3, Chapters 2 and 5]. Ramsey focused on subjective
probability alone, and required only that some problem instances fall within the scope of
what has since become orthodox decision theory. Thus, a newly recognized category of
excluded problem instances would be unlikely to bar decision theory from its assigned
parts in these other theories.
There is cause, however, for a practicing orthodox analyst to take care when comparing
monetary certainties with risks. Many practitioners already avoid such comparisons dur-
ing utility curve and subjective probability assessment. Some new procedures are suggested
here for sensitivity analysis, a routine ﬁnal step for checking the theory’s recommendation
in a problem instance.2. Decision axioms
Many restatements of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s axioms have appeared. The
following account is typical. The axioms and the fundamental expected utility theorem
derived from them are motivated based upon hypothetical exchanges. This approach is
suited to the upcoming discussion of Pfanzagl’s distinctive kind of exchange, and respects
the theory’s commitment to provide advice about exchanges under uncertainty.
Lottery speciﬁcations are denoted as triples, e.g. (p: a,b) The ﬁrst element p is the prob-
ability of receiving the second element, with a complementary probability, 1  p, of receiv-
ing the third element. The second and third element may be a grant or another lottery. The
enclosing device may be parentheses, square brackets, or braces.
As is usual, the axioms and a theorem they imply are written for dichotomous lotteries.
The easy extension from two alternatives to many alternatives is omitted here.
In writing about the axioms, we shall use the symbol ‘‘P’’, as in AP B. The symbol
‘‘’’, as in A  B, is shorthand for AP B and BP A. The symbol ‘‘>’’, as in A > B, is
shorthand for AP B but not BP A.
AP B is often read ‘‘B is not strictly preferred to A’’. While that is a ﬁne reading, con-
sider also ‘‘It could happen that the decision maker, holding B and being able to exchange
it freely for A, would voluntarily do so’’. That reading embodies what is meant here by the
hypothetical exchange, or simply exchange, interpretation.
Ordering of outcomes. For any outcomes a,b,c: aP b or bP a or both; if aP b and
bP c, then aP c; and aP a.
Since our current concern is exclusively with money, this axiom seems uncontroversial.
Transitivity. For any lotteries A,B,C: if AP B and BP C, then AP C.
This axiom summarizes one view of the force of the received theory’s prescriptions.
Suppose that one of the lotteries A and C is to be chosen. Suppose we also notice that there
is a series of exchanges beginning with C and ending with A which, if oﬀered, we would
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willingly undo.
The existence of such a series is a plausible rebutter to the proposition that we ought to
choose C in the actual choice before us. When we choose A instead of C, then the series’
existence furnishes a plausible explanation and justiﬁcation of that choice.
The axiom also says that having found a strict, ‘‘one way’’ series of free exchanges lead-
ing from C to A, then we assume that there is no other series of exchanges leading from A
back to C. If that assumption is correct, then the force of the arguments of the preceding
paragraph is that much stronger. If not, however, then that would contradict this axiom,
and would also present the decision maker with two incompatible arguments about what
to do when choosing between A and C.
Probability dominance. For any outcomes a,b where aP b, and any probabilities p,q:
pP q () (p: a,b)P (q: a,b).
There are some lotteries for which the direction of free exchange seems compelling. The
axiom also justiﬁes our notation for lotteries, in which only the probabilities, and not the
propositions, appear.
Compound probability. For any outcomes a,b and any three probabilities
p,q, r: [p:(q: a,b), (r: a,b)]  [pq + (1  p)r:a,b].Independence. For any probability p and any four lotteries or outcomes A, B, C, and D:
if AP C and BP D, then (p: A,B)P (p: C,D).
These two axioms express and apply the notion that the scope of the theory is restricted
to situations where all that matters to the decision maker are the grants and whether or not
he or she attains them, as gauged by probabilities. That idea has already been woven into
the notation chosen for lotteries, as just mentioned.
Compound probability extends the idea in a blunt and straightforward way. Indepen-
dence has historically been controversial, but it has a simple exchange interpretation. If we
owned (p: C,D), then we would be willing to swap C to get A if the proposition whose
probability is p comes true. We could commit to do so in advance of knowing the truth.
Similarly, we could commit in advance to swap D to get B. The original lottery plus these
two commitments is constructively identical to acquiring the lottery (p: A,B) on the same
propositions. But, as noted, we do not care about the propositions, only their probabili-
ties, and so the axiom is assumed as stated.
That these axioms entail a restriction on the scope of the theory, and exclude risk-spe-
ciﬁc aﬀects from the theory, was fully acknowledged by von Neumann and Morgenstern.
Casinos plainly operate on other principles, emphasizing the recreational possibilities of
gambling. Other occasions of risk may be unpleasant.
Continuity. For any outcomes aP bP c: there is a unique probability p for which
(p: a,c)  b.
The interpretation of this axiom was inﬂuenced by Pfanzagl’s investigations, to be dis-
cussed in the next section. On its face, however, the axiom assumes a general exchange
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simple existence assumption; transitivity, ordering of outcomes, and probability domi-
nance would establish its uniqueness if p existed.
Expected utility theorem. There exists a function U( ) whose domain is the set of out-
comes in the interval [x,y], such that for lotteries A = (p: a,b) and C = (q: c,d) with out-
comes in that interval: AP C () pU(a) + (1  p)U(b)P qU(c) + (1  q)U(d).
Many of the contemporary proofs of this theorem, of which Pearl’s [7] is a typical
example, proceed by constructing a series of acceptable exchanges leading from C to A.
In sketch form, the usual construction parallels the following.
For all z in [x,y], one deﬁnes U(z) as the unique probability which appears in the con-
tinuity axiom relating z to a lottery oﬀering prizes x or y. For the outcomes of lottery A
a  ½UðaÞ : x; y; b  ½UðbÞ : x; y:
The independence axiom implies that
A  fp : ½UðaÞ : x; y; ½UðbÞ : x; yg;
which can be rewritten by compound probability and transitivity as
A  ½pUðaÞ þ ð1 pÞUðbÞ : x; y
and similarly, we can write for C that
C  ½qUðcÞ þ ð1 qÞUðdÞ : x; y
and so by probability dominance and transitivity, we conclude that
AP C just when pUðaÞ þ ð1 pÞUðbÞP qUðcÞ þ ð1 qÞUðdÞ:
Based on this method of proof, we can say that any expected utility comparison expedi-
tiously detects the existence of an exchange series leading from one lottery to another with-
out the bother of actually constructing a speciﬁc series of exchanges. If the calculations
result in a strict inequality, then we assume from transitivity that there is no series of free
exchanges in the other direction.
There are, of course, any number of other conceptions of what good decision making
might to be like. A sense of the breadth of recent thought on heterodox decision analysis
can be had from collections such as that edited by Gilboa [8].
3. Pfanzagl
If the continuity axiom is accepted, then it is easily understood how the quantity b men-
tioned in the axiom statement came to be called the certainty equivalent of the lottery
(p: a,c). Pfanzagl [6] accepted the received axioms, and proposed a further axiom of his
own,
Consistency. For amounts of money a, b, c, and x: if (p: a,c)  b, then (p: a +
x, c + x)  b + x.Among Pfanzagl’s arguments was one based upon what will be called here a Pfanzagl
exchange. Someone who owned the lottery (p: a + x,c + x) would freely trade it for the
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situations before and after the trade are identical if the payment coincides with the reso-
lution of the lottery. The same risk is being described or realized two diﬀerent ways.
Pfanzagl’s argument is that (p: a + x,c + x) ought to have the same value as the com-
bination of (p: a,c) and a payment of x. Even if one used a non-probabilistic calculus, if
the event for a + x is the same as for a, and similarly for c + x and for c, then the two sit-
uations are essentially identical. The argument does not depend on the value of x.
However, Pfanzagl’s axiom is peculiar to the received theory, since it refers to that the-
ory’s speciﬁc certainty equivalent. Within the received theory, it does not follow that just
because the two situations have the same value, then the certainty equivalent of
(p: a + x,c + x) must be x plus the certainty equivalent of (p: a,c). Pfanzagl’s suggestion
is one way, but not the only way, to ensure equal valuation of the two situations in concert
with the conventional axioms.
As precedent for his axiom, Pfanzagl cited von Neumann and Morgenstern’s concept of
‘‘strategic equivalence’’, an element of their theory for n-person games [1, Chapter VI].
That strategic equivalence implied some constraint beyond the contents of the original axi-
oms had already been observed by Luce and Raiﬀa [9, p. 185ﬀ.]. Pfanzagl cited other
authors who had relied upon principles similar to consistency or strategic equivalence,
without acknowledging that they had exceeded the axioms’ deductive closure.
Pfanzagl went on to show that only two families of utility functions (i.e. the functions
aU( ) + b, a > 0; all of which reach the same expected utility decisions as U( ) itself) con-
form both with the usual axioms and either with his consistency axiom or with strategic
equivalence. These are linear utility U(z) = z, and exponential utility, U(z) = ±exp(cz),
for non-zero constant c and sign chosen to give a function increasing in z.
Historically, a full appreciation of the role of risk aversion in conventional decision the-
ory came only after Pfanzagl’s studies, based on the seminal work of Pratt [10]. For a twice
diﬀerentiable utility function U( ), Pratt deﬁned the risk aversion function
rðzÞ  U 00ðzÞ=U 0ðzÞ;
where z is a person’s total wealth. For exponential utility, r(z) = c, where c is a constant,
and for linear utility, r(z) = 0. These two families, and only these two families, display con-
stant risk aversion, that is, r( ) does not vary with z.
Behavior resembling decreasingly positive risk aversion, especially when facing fair or
favorable risks, is not disturbing [11]. People might well value lotteries at less than their
expected monetary value (the positive part, that is, r(z) > 0). Further, the eﬀect might plau-
sibly diminish with greater wealth (that is, r(z) decreases in z), e.g. perhaps someone who
would reject a particular favorable lottery like (.5: $120, $100) when poor might accept it
when rich.
With such an attitude toward risk, the diﬀerence between the certainty equivalents of
(p: a,c) and (p: a + x,c + x) might diﬀer from x. Receiving a positive side payment
increases the decision maker’s wealth. Unless the decision maker exhibits constant risk
aversion, that increase in wealth inﬂuences the conventional decision maker’s valuation
of (p: a,c). For someone who is decreasingly positive risk averse, greater wealth increases
the valuation of the lottery compared with smaller wealth.
Pfanzagl’s proposed axiom was rejected as an obligatory feature of rational choice, but
is not held to be irrational if that is how you feel about risk. That still left the problem of
ensuring that the combination of (p: a,c) and x would be valued the same as
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modeling convention [11].
Practitioners were cautioned that if a situation like holding (p: a,c) and x appeared in a
decision problem, then it was to be recast as the lottery (p: a + x,c + x), and never the
other way around. Indeed, all outcomes were to be coded as the ‘‘terminal wealth’’ for util-
ity computation purposes if there was any chance of ambiguity (but lottery outcomes rou-
tinely continue to appear in problem statements described as changes in wealth, as we do
here).
A further reﬁnement of both theory and practice clariﬁed the buying and selling prices
of a lottery. Both purchases and sales obviously change the decision maker’s wealth, and
so may aﬀect the willingness to accept a lottery and the value imputed to it.
The selling price was deﬁned as the wealth change corresponding to the certainty equiv-
alent that appears in the continuity axiom statement. The buying price for the lottery
(p: a,c) became that amount b for which the lottery (p: a  b,c  b) has a selling price
of zero, as assessed at one’s wealth before acquiring the lottery.
It is easy to show that the buying and selling prices agree in sign for all utility functions,
and so agree in value at zero. It is also a standard result that for decreasingly risk averse
utilities, the buying price is less than the selling price when both are positive.
It is uncontroversial that the modeling conventions and deﬁnitions which accommodate
non-constant risk aversion are consistent in the sense that the same constellation of risks
and grants will yield the same expected utility values regardless of how the problem is
described. The conventions and deﬁnitions do not deny Pfanzagl’s observation that the
combination of (p: a,c) and x eﬀectively restates (p: a + x,c + x), but rather they seek to
integrate this fact into decision practice, without altering the axioms.
4. A Pfanzagl exchange puzzle
We shall from now on denote the combination of a lottery L and a side payment of x as
{L,x}. We shall mean that x is paid now, and that the lottery L is resolved sometime later.
The two elements are not otherwise bound to one another. The money (if x > 0) may be
spent and the lottery may be exchanged as the decision maker wishes.
This convention makes {L,x} a slight improvement over the lottery L with all of its
prizes increased by some positive x. Assuming the usual and uncontroversial ideas about
the direction of time preference, if x is paid now, while the lottery is held to maturity, then
the decision maker has the use of the money x while waiting for L to be resolved. Through-
out this paper, it is assumed that L will be resolved promptly enough that the monetary
value of holding x is negligible (e.g. no interest can be earned from x during the time in
question). The early use of x is the only advantage conferred by {L,x} over the original
lottery, e.g. {L,x} is not ‘‘safer’’ than the original lottery.
Suppose that a decreasingly risk averse decision maker has initial wealth w and holds a
favorable and acceptable lottery (p: a,c) whose selling price is s and whose buying price is
b, s > b > 0. If asked, and after consulting the received theory for guidance, the decision
maker asserts that he or she will accept no sum less than s in exchange for the lottery,
as the theory counsels.
The decision maker is oﬀered the combination {(p: a  b,c  b),b} to replace the lottery
he or she owns, and accepts this Pfanzagl exchange for the slightly superior situation that
it is compared with the original lottery. An opportunity to consume, perhaps to enjoy a
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spend the b to experience the consumption good. That experience ends while the residual
lottery, (p: a  b,c  b), remains pending.
A lottery dealer then oﬀers to take the residual lottery from the decision maker without
compensation to either party. From the dealer’s point of view, this may be a good deal,
since the expected monetary value of the lottery is positive.
After consulting the received theory, the decision maker, whose wealth is once again w,
calculates the selling price of the residual lottery as zero. Finding zero to be oﬀered, the
decision maker gives the lottery to the dealer, as the theory counsels to be fair.
A series of free exchanges thus exists in which the decision maker would sell the original
lottery (literally, accept a sum of money and surrender the lottery) for less than s. Part of
our conﬁdence in the reasonableness of the received theory’s advice is the assumption of
the transitivity axiom that no such series exists.
An aggressive dealer could hasten the action by writing the combination
{(p: a  b,c  b),b} and making the Pfanzagl exchange, which is a riskless transaction
for both parties. The dealer would then produce a restaurant guide, let nature take its
course, and accost the decision maker as he or she left the eatery.
This is not a Dutch book problem. Nobody exploits anybody else, and the dealer can
tell the decision maker all about the plan. Note also that except for that misunderstanding
about what the minimum selling price is, the theory otherwise gives the decision maker
arguably good advice. The Pfanzagl exchange is harmless, and what the theory counsels
at the restaurant door plausibly reﬂects the decision maker’s preferences and circum-
stances at the time.
A misunderstood minimum selling price may have consequences. In a slightly more
complicated version of the puzzle, suppose the decision maker with wealth w were oﬀered
the opportunity to replace (p: a,c) with either the Pfanzagl exchange {(p: a  b,c  b),b}
or else the amount (b + s)/2. That amount is less than s, and the theory would counsel
rejecting it, even as it recognizes the Pfanzagl exchange to be harmless.
A shrewd counselor might ask the decision maker ‘‘How sure are you that you will hold
onto that side payment of b’’. The decision maker who is inclined to spend the side pay-
ment promptly may in fact be better oﬀ, that is, end up with (s  b)/2 more money, by
taking the (b + s)/2, despite its being less than s, rather than the Pfanzagl exchange.
Then again, the decision maker might intend to hold onto the side payment through the
resolution of the residual lottery (of positive value to the decision maker if his or her
wealth is greater than w, as it will be so long as the side payment is held). If dealers lurk
and bistros beckon, then there is no way to know which is the better trade, except to ask.
These stories present no diﬃculty for the user of a constant risk aversion utility func-
tion, for whom the buying and selling prices are equal. The stories also illustrate that
for others, it may be diﬃcult in principle to answer the question ‘‘What one sum of money
is worth the same to you as owning some speciﬁed lottery’’?
For some people, diﬀerent series of exchanges can result in diﬀerent sums being
accepted in compensation for the surrender of the lottery. The received continuity axiom,
conceived before Pfanzagl’s and Pratt’s studies, assumes that only one sum would emerge
in any series of exchanges.
Accommodating Pfanzagl’s observation by a modeling convention, while leaving the
original axioms unchanged, introduced a dissonance in the conventional theory. The
received axioms formalize the idea that acceptable hypothetical exchanges are a reliable
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able within the axioms be overlooked in favor of others, as happens in the stories of this
section. The convention oﬀers no basis to deny that the overlooked exchanges are indeed
rationally acceptable. The emergence of anomalies cannot be a surprise.
5. Allais’ problem
Allais [5] reported in the early 1950s that some people prefer a lottery oﬀering a 10%
chance of some positive amount of money (call it great) and a complementary chance
of no gain nor loss (call that 0) rather than a lottery oﬀering an 11% chance of a smal-
ler-than-great positive amount (call that good) and a complementary chance of 0. The
same people also prefer to take the good amount rather than a lottery with an 89% chance
of good, a 10% chance of great, and a 1% chance of 0. There is no utility function on {0,
good, great} that agrees with both of these choices.
From its beginning, what speciﬁc aspect of the received axioms Allais’ report concerns
has been murky. The editor of Econometrica documented that diﬃculty in a note which
appeared with Allais’ paper.
Allais portrayed himself as rebutting Savage’s ‘‘sure thing’’ principle, a type of dom-
inance rule. Savage’s principle [3, pp. 21–22] says that if act f is weakly preferred to act g
if B were true, and so too if B were false, then f is weakly preferred to g, even while the
truth about B is unknown. If additionally in either case, the preference for f over g were
strict, then f would be strictly preferred to g when both B and not-B are possible.
However, Allais also reported himself in favor of the closely related probability domi-
nance principle [5, p. 518]. Perhaps this contributed to the Econometrica editor’s
confusion.
Compare Ellsberg’s [12] three-colors puzzle, also constructed around Savage’s sure-
thing principle and probability dominance. Ellsberg, however, tells us of his more speciﬁc
doubt, whether a decision maker selects a single probability distribution when given a set
of possible ones.
Ellsberg’s puzzle consists of two choice situations. An unknown probability, constant
throughout the two situations, is denoted by the variable q
Choose either ð1=3 : $100; 0Þ or else ½1=3 : 0; ðq : $100; 0Þ;
Choose either ½1=3 : $100; ðq : 0; $100Þ or else ð1=3 : 0; $100Þ:
Some people prefer the simpler lotteries in each case, (1/3: $100,0) and (1/3: 0,$100).
There is no value for q, however, where both more complex lotteries are inferior, based
on the probability dominance principle (at q = 1/2, the probability for each prize would
be the same within each pair of options; the simpler lotteries are thus admissible choices
in Savage’s theory, but not both strictly better than their respective alternatives).
Only two distinct outcomes appear among all of Ellsberg’s options. Presumably,
you would in each situation pick the option with the greater probability of the better
outcome, if you had chosen a speciﬁc probability (that is, a speciﬁc value for q) to guide
your choices. Someone who had so chosen could reject all of the usual utility theory except
for probability dominance, and still give fully orthodox answers to Ellsberg’s questions.
In Allais, on the other hand, precise probabilities are given. Probability dominance does
not decide any of Allais’ choices. The two puzzles thus raise diﬀerent concerns.
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within the scope of the axioms before Pfanzagl’s consistency proposal and Pratt’s analysis
of risk aversion. Morgenstern [13] was a prominent exception, believing among other
things that the ostensible violations depended on risk-speciﬁc aﬀects.
Savage [3, pp. 100–104] oﬀered a hypothetical exchange argument on behalf of his the-
ory’s advice in Allais, which convinced him to reconsider his own inclination to choose
contrary to that advice. Savage imagined literal lottery tickets, and saw the certainty of
good as owning three blocks of tickets whose probabilities of winning add up to 100%.
The other choice situation might begin with owning 11% worth of good tickets.
Both of Allais’ hypotheticals, he then realized, ask whether he would forfeit a ‘‘1%
chance of good’’ ticket in order to exchange a ‘‘10% of good’’ ticket block for a ‘‘10%
chance of great’’ block. Savage felt he would give the same answer to the same question.
This argument was ﬁrst presented no later than 1954. Current decision theory does not
hold that an exchange acceptable at one wealth level (owning good in whatever form) is
generally acceptable with diﬀerent wealth.
The argument as written may be valid for Savage; perhaps he preferred constant risk
aversion. As a vehicle to convince others, however, the argument loses force for failing
to consider what the received theory itself now recognizes as things that rational folk
might consider. To reach the same conclusion, more needs to be said.
Allais violations plainly involve a choice between a risk and an amount for certain,
leading to a lottery being exchanged for less than its recommended selling price. We have
already seen that the received theory may encounter counterarguments to its regulation of
comparisons of monetary risks with monetary certainties. Among the possibilities in Allais
is the following hypothetical series of exchanges.
Assume you would choose (.10: great, 0) over (.11: good, 0), and that you are decreas-
ingly positive risk averse. Let L be the three-way lottery in Allais, and L* be that lottery
with each of its outcomes reduced by the amount good. The combination {L*, good}
slightly improves upon L; you would swap L for the combination if it were oﬀered to you.
Suppose you have consumption opportunities, or family responsibilities, or other press-
ing claims on your resources, so that you have immediate uses for some part of good
besides holding it idle to increase your valuation of L* while waiting for that lottery to
be resolved. In other words, if the amount good became available as in {L*, good}, then
you foresee that you would promptly spend or encumber some positive part of it, c, leav-
ing you owning the combination {L*, good-c}, in addition to your initial wealth.
Depending upon the buying price of L* and the size of c, it could also be that you prefer
good-c alone to {L*, good-c}, and that your preference conforms with what the theory
holds about the inﬂuence of wealth on your willingness to bear risk. If so, then you would
give away the residual lottery if you could.
A hypothetical series of exchanges would thus exist in which you would, if you could,
willingly surrender L in order to receive the amount good. The received theory says that
there are other hypothetical exchanges where you would choose L over good.
The theory’s advice in such a case has met with contrary arguments fashioned from the
same body of principles as those upon which the theory relies. These counterarguments do
not reﬂect any diﬀerent view of personal rationality, but do take into account an addi-
tional elementary fact about money and risks: the former can be easily spent while the lat-
ter cannot. The conclusion of this section, then, is that the axiomatic theory cannot decide
the rationality of Allais violations, and never could.
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other problem. When conﬂict arises, it places the conﬂicted problem instance outside the
scope of the theory, much as the aﬀects set aside by von Neumann and Morgenstern have
always placed other problem instances outside that scope. Part of the documented confu-
sion about which axioms are violated by Allais’ example may be that the principles sup-
posedly formalized by those axioms are not necessarily being violated.
Conﬂict merely explains why someone who accepts those principles might prefer to
decline the axioms’ advice in some speciﬁc case. Such a decision maker may then proceed
to choose based upon whatever other considerations he or she ﬁnds persuasive instead,
without in any way abjuring the received theory.
6. Consequences for decision craft
Decision analysis applies the orthodox theory to recommend choices in real problem
instances. One part of that task is the assessment of a decision maker’s utility curve and
subjective probabilities, often based on hypothetical betting.
As von Winterfeldt and Edwards [14] document, practitioners have long been wary of
posing for curve assessment purposes hypothetical bets which feature choices between
risks and amounts for sure. The basis for that wariness may include concern about a psy-
chological ‘‘certainty eﬀect’’, whose empirical foundation is surely in part attributable to
Allais. Be that as it may, the precautions already typically enacted seem adequate to pre-
vent miscalibration from anything discussed here.
Late in a decision modeling episode comes sensitivity analysis [15], which checks that
utility and probability values found to be crucial to the ﬁnal recommendation have been
accurately measured. Checking may conﬁrm that the crucial values are satisfactorily accu-
rate, in which case the analyst’s job is ﬁnished. Otherwise, the remedial task is open-ended
and follows no universally prescribed protocol. In consultation with the decision maker,
the analyst reviews and adjusts values used in the model, until the decision maker is sat-
isﬁed that his or her beliefs and preferences have been correctly portrayed.
The anomaly described here is not a matter of accurate measurement. It is the situation
itself that warrants scrutiny. Existing sensitivity analysis practices should be enlarged to
include re-examination of choice junctures which oﬀer a variably risk-averse decision
maker the possibility of release from monetary uncertainty, whether or not the numbers
involved are close in expected utility value.
Also unlike existing sensitivity analysis, this checking must be done at the problem
description level, not on the model. Modelers routinely ‘‘rearrange’’ lotteries for analytical
purposes [16], e.g. a lottery with a side payment becomes a simple lottery with diﬀerent
prizes. The issue of concern is whether or not the actual decision situation, as opposed
to its theoretically equivalent model, oﬀers the possibility of release.
The release that the sensitivity analyst should be looking for is the appearance of
resources which are able to leave the frame of the problem. The resources could be side pay-
ments received before the resolution of uncertainty in a decision episode, or a terminal
grant disfavored by the orthodox advice, like the one in Allais’ problem (if you choose good
for sure, then both you and the money leave the problem; if the theory advises you to take
the grant, then there is nothing new to check based on the anomaly discussed here).
The simple possibility of release does not render orthodox advice invalid. The decision
maker might not object to holding onto a side payment for a while, or might have no
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out the possibility, and ask the decision maker whether this matters to him or her.
Absent such objection or interest, no anomalous hypothetical exchange series would
arise. If, on the other hand, the decision maker ﬁnds persuasive force in arguments con-
ﬂicting with orthodox advice, then there is no mechanical resolution of the impasse.
The theory’s advice reﬂects a particular viewpoint, as advice typically does. It is the
decision maker’s free choice to decide whether to accept the advice. Even if the advice
is declined, the decision maker may still ﬁnd value in having considered the problem
instance from a perspective diﬀerent from his or her own.
7. Conclusions
While the combination of (p: a,c) and x restates (p: a + x,c + x), the possibility that x
might be disposed of separately from (p: a,c) opens the door to exchanges unavailable to
the holder of (p: a + x,c + x). For decision makers whose valuation of (p: a,c) depends
upon x, some of the exchanges may be anomalous. That presents a challenge for a theory
which conceives of rationality as logical consistency among willing exchanges, both hypo-
thetical and real.
An expedient modeling convention adopted in the 1960s ensures that diﬀerent descrip-
tions of the same risk receive the same advice. In some problems, however, that assump-
tion attends to some series of exchanges while it ignores others, even though the ignored
series fully respect the principles that the axioms formalize.
Appeal to the axioms fails to exclude Allais violations, along with other things outside
the axioms’ scope, from rational respectability. A serious possibility of invalidity warrants
caution when implementing the contemporary orthodox theory’s advice in some monetary
problems, or when dismissing incompatible advice as irrational.
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